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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
tember 22, 1951, the judgment being still unsatisfied; the administratrix, the defendant,
was appointed on November 8, 1951, and published the notice to creditors of the estate
on March 28, 1952; the plaintiff filed his claim on September 26, 1952-six years and
eight months after judgment. The court has heretofore interpreted the statute of
limitations concerning judgments in litigation involving a living judgment debtor.
This statute, RCW 4.56.210 & 220, has been construed not only to bar the remedy but
to extinguish the substantive right, Hutton v. State, 25 Wn.2d 402, 171 P.2d 248 (1946).
Further, by judicial interpretation the operation of the statute is not tolled by the
absence of the judgment debtor from the jurisdiction. Hemen v. Reinhard, 45 Wash. 1,
87 Pac. 953 (1906). In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff the court, in the principal
case, said, "We hold that, in the event of the death of a judgment debtor, this section
[RCW 11.40.130] applies to the exclusion of all other statutes, so that a claim, valid
at the date of his death, must be allowed as a valid claim against his estate provided it
is filed in accordance with RCW 11.40.010... " This decision clarifies the law in this
particular and puts judgments on the same footing with all other claims against the
estate, so far as the time of presentation is concerned, and thus helps to prevent
injustice.
CRIMINAL LAW
Perjury-What is Necessary to Constitute a Valid Oath in Wash-
ington. Due to the numerous situations in which statements must
be made under oath the question of what constitutes a valid oath
is one of practical importance. In a recent decision' the Washington
Supreme Court said:
It is a matter of common knowledge that in many instances, notaries
acknowledge signatures to claims, affidavits, depositions, and verifica-
tions without the signer actually being present, and also that quite
often, when the signer is present, nothing is said about an oath and no
thought is given to it whatever, thus raising a serious doubt as to
whether a solemn oath had actually been administered by the notary
and taken by the signer.2
Whether a valid oath has or has not been given is a question that
frequently arises in a criminal action for perjury. Is proof of the
defendant's signature and of the signature of the acknowledging
officer sufficient to show the allegedly false statements were made
under oath? There seems to be no clean-cut answer to this question
by the Washington court.
In State v. Dodd,3 the defendant, a public official,, was charged
with perjury for falsifying several monthly claims for expenses.5 The
1 State v. Heyes, 44 Wn.2d 579, 269 P.2d 577 (1954).
2 Id. at 587, 269 P.2d at 582.
3 193 Wash. 26, 74 P.2d 497 (1937).
4 Defendant was the King County Engineer during 1936.
5 Eleven expense account claims, one for each month except February, formed the
basis of the charge.
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defendant twice certified that the claims were accurate, once as the
claimant and again as the head of the department. On direct exam-
ination the notary identified each of the instruments forming the
basis of the perjury counts and testified that the defendant signed
the certificates and that he, the notary, executed the jurat. On cross
examination the defense counsel asked, "You never actually swore
Mr. Dodd on any of those certificates, did you?'" The State objected
to this question as immaterial. In the absence of the jury the defense
counsel made an offer of proof that he merely desired to ask the
witness whether Mr. Dodd raised his hand and said: "I swear the
foregoing facts to be true," or "I swear to the foregoing." The trial
judge sustained the objection, ruling that the notary was estopped
to deny the validity of his certificate.
On appeal the Washington Supreme Court held that there was
sufficient proof of oath to sustain a perjury conviction, taking notice
of the fact that the defendant knew the law required a county officer
to take an oath and sign a certificate in order to collect an expense
account. Also the court noted the fact that the defendant's signing
of the affidavit was not disputed. In addition the court referred to
RCW 9.72.050,' indicating that it was doubtlessly enacted to fore-
close such contentions as were then before the court. In its decision
the Supreme Court referred to, but did not actually adopt or reject,
the estoppel theory of the trial court. The Supreme Court indicated
that the ruling of the lower court was broader than the rule which
had existed in Washiington.7 It also stated that whether the defendant
raised his hand and swore-a question which defense counsel in its
offer of proof indicated it desired to ask-was immaterial.
In the recent case of State v. Heyes,8 the defendant was prosecuted
for perjury for allegedly making false statements in a civil complaint
which had been duly verified. The State was in the process of iden-
tifying the signatures of the defendant and the notary on direct
examination. The prosecuting attorney asked whether the defendant
"deposed and swore" before the notary at the time the jurat was
6 This statute reads: "It shall be no defense to a prosecution for perjury that an
oath was administered or taken in an irregular manner or that defendant was not
competent to give the testimony, deposition, certificate or affidavit of which falsehood
is alleged. It shall be sufficient that he actually gave such deposition, certificate or
affidavit."
7 In Campbell v. Campbell, 146 Wash. 478, 263 Pac. 957 (1928), the court adopted
the rule that a notary's act is ministerial in nature, rather than judicial or quasi-
judicial. Therefore the testimony of the notary is competent to impeach his own jurat.
8 44 Wn.2d 579, 269 P2d 577 (1954).
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made. The notary answered, in effect, that no oath was administered.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the perjury conviction, holding
the prosecution failed to prove one of the essential elements of per-
jury, the swearing under oath. The court raised, but did not answer
the question whether there would have been sufficient proof that an
oath had been administered if the State had merely offered the com-
plaint, including the verification, and had proved the signatures of
the defendant and the notary. On the basis of the Dodd case such
testimony would seemingly be sufficient, if there were no other evi-
dence to the contrary.
One of the important questions which has not as yet been com-
pletely resolved is: who may introduce the evidence to show that no
valid oath has been administered? Seemingly the State may, but by
doing so it would defeat its own case.' But of much more practical
significance, may the defendant introduce such evidence, or is he
"estopped" by the holding in State v. Dodd?
In the Heyes case the State failed to prove that an oath had been
taken by the defendant. Although it proved the signatures of the
defendant and the notary on the complaint, it also proved by its own
witness that no oath was in fact administered. Considering all of
the evidence introduced by the State, it failed to sustain the burden
of proving that an oath was administered.
In the Dodd case the signature of the defendant and that of the
notary were identified. In addition it was shown that the defendant was
a county official and should be presumed to know the significance of
signing a verified expense account. This coupled with the terms of
RCW 9.72.050 was sufficient proof of oath to sustain a perjury convic-
tion.
It would seem that under the holding in the Heyes case the court
does not intend to strictly apply RCW 9.72.050. The State cited the
statute in its brief,"0 but the court made no mention of it in the deci-
sion. The court does not make it absolutely clear whether the defend-
ant's conviction was reversed because the State failed to prove that
an oath of some kind had been administered (thus making RCW
9.72.050 applicable) or because the State's evidence tended to show
that no oath was in fact administered (in which case RCW 9.72.050
may not apply). If the reversal was due to its failure to prove the
oath, then the question whether the defendant may introduce evidence
9 State v. Heyes, supra note 1.
1o Brief of Respondent, p. 19, 21; State v. Heyes, supra note 1.
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to show lack of any oath, is still unanswered. But if the case was
reversed because no oath had in fact been administered, then by
logical hypothesis the defendant should be able to show lack of an
oath as a basic part of his defense:
Until future decisions by the court settle the question as to what
constitutes a valid oath, it necessarily must remain an area of uncer-
tainty. The decisions of the Washington court fail to set a standard
as to what proof the State must introduce to show a valid oath has
been administered.
Burglary-Effect of Possession of Stolen Property Where the
Possession Is Not Exclusive. In State v. Jester," two defendants ap-
pealed from a conviction of burglary in the second degree. -The convic-
tion was based entirely on circumstantial evidence. The Supreme Court
stated the Washington rule to be that possession, accompanied by
inconsistent statements as to the source of goods recently taken in
a burglary, constitutes a prima facie case of second degree burglary. 2
But this rule has been limited in application to a single defendant, 3
and will not apply in a situation where two defendants had equal
opportunity to commit the burglary."
FRANx D. HowAD
Habeas Corpus-Scope of Inquiry and Attack of Illegal Sentence
Before Legal Sentence Has Been Served. In 1947 petitioner was
convicted of a felony, was sentenced, and was committed. In 1949,
while on parole, he was sentenced for a second felony on a plea of
guilty, and was committed. Petitioner applied to the Supreme Court
for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging inter alia that he had been de-
prived of federal and state constitutional rights in that he had been
coerced into pleading guilty to the second offense. He produced a
letter and affidavit written by the prosecutor to the board of prison
terms and paroles indicating that the plea of guilty had been induced
by the threat of revoking petitioner's parole. Respondent argued that
so long as petitioner was lawfully incarcerated under the first sentence
he could not at present attack the second sentence by habeas corpus
11145 Wash. Dec. 571, 277 P.2d 331 (1954).
12 State v. Bobinsld, 170 Wash. 120, 15 P.2d 291 (1932).
is State v. Bobinski, supra note 11.
14 This would also seem to be the rule in other jurisdictions. In Harris v. State,
153 Miss. 1, 120 So. 206 (1929), the mere presence of stolen goods in a house occupied
by two persons, each capable of committing the crime, was held to be insufficient to
sustain a conviction for burglary. A similar result was reached in State v. Zoff, 196
Minn. 382, 264 N.W. 34 (1936), where stolen goods were found in a garage on premises
occupied by defendant and others.
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even though the second conviction was not legal. Held, in In re
Palmer,5 petition referred to the superior court for a hearing to deter-
mine if the plea of guilty was coerced. "There is no due process where a
plea of guilty is involuntary because of coercion."' 8 In answer to re-
spondent's argument the court said that release was not the sole office of
habeas corpus, and that to require petitioner to stay his attack until the
end of the valid sentence would not only vitiate the statutes 17 but would
be a denial of procedural due process.
The case is interesting because it illustrates the application of the
1947 amendment of RCW 7.36.130.18 The amendment provides that
the usual limitation on the scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceed-
ings shall not be applied when the petition alleges that rights under
the federal or state constitution have been violated.' The case shows
that where the allegations, if true, would compel a conclusion that
constitutional rights were violated, the truth of the allegations will
be determined.
The cases that have been decided since the 1947 amendment indi-
cate that upon an allegation of denial of constitutional rights the
petitioner can anticipate the following disposition:"0 (1) If the peti-
tion is filed originally with the Supreme Court the court may deny
the writ either because the allegations fail to show a denial of con-
stitutional rights,2 ' or because the court is able to decide from the
record at hand that the facts fail to support the allegations." The
petition may be referred to the superior court for a necessary fact
determination when it is inexpedient for the Supreme Court to deter-
mine the facts." The court may also refer the petition to the superior
court for the initial determination of both constitutional and fact
issues.24 (2) If the petition is filed originally with the superior court
15 145 Wash. Dec. 258, 273 P.2d 985 (1954).
16 Waley v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
17 RCW 7.36.130, RCW 7.36.140.
18 For a more complete discussion of the 1947 amendment, and the scope of inquiry
in general, see Lobdell, One Limitation On The Use Of The Writ of Habeas Corpus,
28 WASH. L. REv. 47 (1953).
19 Collateral attack of a judgment by habeas corpus ordinarily cannot be maintained
if the judgment is valid on its face. In re Thompson, 33 Wn.2d 142, 204 P.2d 525 (1949).
20 RCW 7.36.140 makes it the duty of the Supreme Court to determine the validity of
a contention that the petitioner has been denied a right guaranteed by the federal
constitution. In the instant case the court stated that an allegation of facts was
necessary in addition to the allegation of denial of federal constitutional rights so that
the court might fulfill its duty.
21 In re Payne, 30 Wn.2d 646, 192 P.2d 964 (1948) ; In re Pettus, 41 Wn.2d 567, 250
P.2d 542 (1952).
22 In re Buckingham, 145 Wash. Dec. 107, 273 P.2d 494 (1954).
23 In re Johnson, 43 Wn.2d 200, 260 P.2d 873 (1953) ; In re Palmer, supra note 15.
24 In re Thompson, 33 Wn.2d 142, 204 P.2d 525 (1949) ; In re Gensburg, 35 Wn.2d
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there must be a determination of the constitutional questions, and a
further hearing where it is necessary to determine the facts.25  (3) The
petitioner can of course appeal from the determination of the superior
court.
26
There is a second and more significant aspect to the case. Prior
cases seemingly indicated that if the petitioner was presently lawfully
incarcerated he could not attack an invalid sentence by habeas corpus.
This result was indicated where the sentence was partially invalid'
because it included an excessive minimum term and the prisoner had
not yet served the legal minimum,2" and where a cumulative sentence
was claimed to be illegal in whole or in part and the prisoner had
not yet served the prior legal sentence. 8 In the instant case the court
cleared the ground by holding that in Washington release is not the
sole purpose of habeas corpus, and that therefore the argued limitation
did not apply. Where an attack on the legality of a conviction is based
on sufficient constitutional grounds and a fact issue is raised there
must be a speedy determination of fact if postponement would lessen
the petitioner's opportunity to prove his allegations. Under these cir-
cumstances postponement would be a denial of procedural due process.
If a question of law only is involved there would seem to be no
prejudice in postponing the application for the writ, for such a ques-
tion can be as readily decided at the end of the valid sentence as now.
Nevertheless the court has been lenient in ordering resentencing by
the superior court, or a redetermination of the sentence by the board
of prison terms and paroles.80 This practice is additional evidence that
the writ, in Washington, is not used exclusively as a means toward
securing release.
PHILLIP OFFENBACKER
Statutory Interpretation. The recent case of State ex rel. Mason v. Superior Court,
44 Wn2d 67, 265 P.2d 253 (1954), was an original proceeding for an alternative writ
of mandate. In 1939 petitioner, was sentenced to the state penitentiary for fifteen years
on a grand larceny conviction. He was subsequently released and given a discharge
849, 215 P.2d 880 (1950) ; In re Mason, 42 Wn2d 610, 257 P2d 211 (1953) ; In re
Allen, 145 Wash. Dec. 22, 272 P.2d 152 (1954).
25 In re Pennington, 35 Wn2d 267, 212 P.2d 811 (1949) ; In re Thorne, 39 Wn.2d
43, 234 P.2d 517 (1951).
26 Cases cited notes 23. 24, and 25 supra.
2 7 In re Blystone, 75 Wash. 286, 134 Pac. 827 (1913).
2 8 1n re Miller, 129 Wash. 538, 225 Pac. 429 (1924) ; In re Grant, 24 Wn.2d 839,
167 P.2d 123 (1946) ; In re Mooney, 26 Wn2d 243, 173 P.2d 655 (1946).2 9 In re Towne, 14 Wn2d 633, 129 P2d 230 (1942) ; In re Homer, 19 Wn.2d 51,
141 P2d 151 (1943) ; In re Bass, 26 Wn2d 872, 176 P.2d 355 (1947) ; In re Sorenson,
34 Wn2d 659, 209 P2d 479 (1949); In re Siipola, 38 Wn2d 848, 232 P2d 920 (1951).30In re DeLano, 44 Wn2d 63, 265 P.2d 263 (1954).
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from parole supervision on July 13, 1949. On March 11, 1950, he was sentenced for
forgery committed while on parole. Petitioner asks for a construction of RCW
9.92.080 that would prevent his confinement for the latter offense to begin until the
expiration of his previous fifteen year maximum sentence. The statute reads inter ali:
".... whenever a person while under sentence of a felony commits another felony and
sentenced to another term of imprisonment, such latter term shall not begin until the
expiration of all prior terms. .. ." The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding
that the statute in question should be interpreted as if the italicized words were added:
"... whenever a person while under sentence of a felony commits another felony and
is sentenced to another term of imprisonment, such latter term shall not begin until
expiration of incarceration under all prior terms. ..
DAMAGES
Damages for a Private Nuisance. In the two recent cases of Riblet
v. Spokane-Portland Cement Co.,1 the plaintiff sought damages for
injury caused by dust from defendant's cement plant. Plaintiff had
built his "dream house" on high ground overlooking the plant; and
was continually troubled by such annoyances as sludge in his swimming
pool, encrustation of cement dust on his house, and a dusty sensation
in his respiratory system. On the first trial, the trial court dismissed
the action, relying on the case of Powell v. Superior Portland Cement,
Inc.'
The decision in the well-known Powell case was handed down by
the Washington Supreme Court in 1942. In that case it was held that
one who voluntarily purchases property in a manufacturing community
cannot be compensated for any injury caused by such inconveniences
as dust, smoke or gases that are a necessary incident of lawful industrial
operations. Neither injunction nor damages were granted. The con-
curring judges rested their opinion on the proposition that plaintiff
had failed to prove any substantial injury to his property, and that no
damages could be allowed for mere diminution of personal enjoyment
of one's property. The court had ample authority for denying the
injunction;' but in denying damages, it overruled much Washington
authority to the contrary.4 Shortly after the Powell decision, an ex-
cellent comment in the Washington Law Review' soundly criticized
141 Wn.2d 249, 248 P.2d 380 (1952), and 145 Wash. Dec. 323, 274 P2d 574 (1954).
2 15 Wn.2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
aBartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 131 Wash. 183, 229 Pac. 306 (1924) ; Mattson v.
Defiance Lumber Co., 154 Wash. 503, 282 Pac. 848 (1929).
4 Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., supra note 3; Mattson v. Defiance Lumber Co.,
supra note 3; Hardin v. Olympic Portland Cement Co., 89 Wash. 320, 154 Pac. 450
(1916) ; Sterrett v. Northport Mining and Smelting Co., 30 Wash. 164, 70 Pac. 266
(1902).
5 Comment, Recovery of Damages for Private Nuisance, 18 WAsH. L. Rxv. 31
(1943).
[MAY
